Skip to content

Essays On Moral

The greatest gift of human rationality is morality. The establishment of “morality” is based on the recognition that every human has a general set of basic needs to lead a life free of physical and psychological suffering. In Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity and Human Rights, James Kellenberger addresses different sorts of theories of morality, such as moral absolutism, moral pluralism, and moral relativism. Before I take any position on the issues raised by the differences between these various approaches, I need to offer a definition of morality. Morality, in the context of these different kinds of theories, can be defined only descriptively in relation to its purpose and to its function. Metaphysical questions such as “Is morality an absolute truth?” (which are not in the scope of this essay) are in fact, beyond comprehension by mere reasoning and argumentation. People can only try to provide different answers based on their own assumptions, faiths, experiences and intuitions. Thus, morality, in the most practical sense, is a tool or way of life used to promote the common good of human beings and eliminate harmful actions that bring negative consequences in life, goals based on the principle of reciprocity and empathy, and a set of universally recognized human needs and capabilities.

In line with such grounding, I find that among different types of moral theories, moral pluralism can best serve the universal needs and well being of human kind. Pluralism recognizes that there is a plurality of moral points of view, and affirms that, among many moral points of view, no one is clearly superior to another. Yet, it insists on a certain set of context-independent values and an objectivity in judging value conflicts that is not determined by group’s conventions or individual attitudes. However, the pluralistic nature of this theory and the fact that no complete objectivity is possible could be sources of its fallacies when it is put into practice. No one can be completely objective in their judgments because every human being possesses different perceptions and principles of life that contribute to personal bias.

Thus, to avoid these possible sources of error, moral pluralism needs to be governed by three principles:
1) an unambiguous categorization of moral values,
2) the establishment of a minimalist common ground, and
3) a flexibility with regard to the prioritization of moral values.

A clear and unambiguous categorization of values that are strictly “moral” in nature is essential as the founding basis of moral pluralism. Moral values should be strictly distinguished from other categories of values such as cultural norms or community values. Moral values, in their essence, should be geared only towards the goal of fulfilling universal needs of well being that are not governed by cultural practices or norms. For example, the prohibition against arbitrary killing can safely be categorized as a moral value. However, “values” such as that women are supposed to wear dresses can only be categorized as cultural norms. Even socio-political values like ‘unity’ and ‘collectivity’ are only conventional and cannot be strictly termed as “moral values”. The lack of strict categorization of moral values, I believe, is one of the biggest problems to be resolved even before the debates between different moral theories can continue. One common flaw among several forms of moral relativism is the failure to draw such clear distinctions between different categories of values. For instance, conventionalist relativism claims that secondary values are considered as relative and are dependent on conventions or social norms. In this context, secondary values are no longer strictly moral, but adulterated by other categories of values which are non-moral. Similarly, perspectivist relativism proposes that “primary values have “associated benefits and harms'” that may be physiological (e.g., food and nature), psychological (e.g., love and humiliation), and social (e.g., respect and exploitation).” It is easy to see that there are very blurry lines between physiological needs, social values, and moral values.

In Problems of Moral Philosophy, Ralph Barton Perry addresses the phenomenon of arbitrary categorization of values by pointing out a distinction between the question: “What does ‘value’ mean?” and the question: “What things have value?” Analogously, the statement that peace is a condition in which societies abstain from the use of violence in settling their disputes is different from the statement that the world is (or is not) now at peace. Too often, because of such an ambiguity in distinguishing the nuances between definitions, cultural beliefs and physical needs are arbitrarily lumped into subcategories of moral values.

Equivocal overlapping of cultural values, community values, and moral values only jeopardizes the applicability of moral pluralism. Such a failure encourages abuse of the theory to justify actions for pure individual interests or social conventions. For example, in Jordan, women are tortured in the name of “committing immoral acts” when they are found to be talking to male strangers, even though the action of “talking to male stranger” could be intrinsically non-moral. Thus, it is important to draw a clear boundary between pluralistic moral values and other categories of values, such as cultural pluralism or religious pluralism.

The establishment of a minimalist common ground is another important principle in the application of moral pluralism. A minimalist common ground requires that ethics be reduced to its most basic elements, those that are required for every human to behave ethically. Such a methodology is crucial especially in response to a pluralist society today. Before I further reinforce my claim, it is important to recognize a limit of the theory of minimalist ethics. One of the possible fallacies of minimalist ethics is that it implies that an action is ethical as long as it does not hurt anybody. The simplistic and consequentialist nature of this school of ethics provides loopholes for actions done for pure self-interest that indirectly bring negative consequences for others. Thus, the minimalist approach should only be interpreted as a methodology, not as a moral guidance. It is imperative that the minimalist ground should not be manipulated as the sole justification for all kinds of actions.

How should a minimalist common ground be established to reinforce the applicability of moral pluralism? We should recognize that no single individual or group has precisely the same perception of truth and reality due to the differences in religious faith, personal experience and other factors. Just as cognitive relativism embraces moral relativism, cognitive diversity promotes different applications of moral values. In moral pluralism, the stress on certain context-independent values requires a certain level of “cognitive agreement.” To achieve such an agreement, it is pertinent to use a minimalist approach to establish a limit to the scope of acceptable moral grounds among diverse cultures. Such a limit signifies the line between ungrounded perspective (such as superstitions) and rational logic that is based on empirical examination and truths. The ‘truths’ that are derived empirically, when combined with rationality and universally recognized moral values, form a solid minimalist groundwork. William James, a modern advocate of pragmatism, synthesizes the best elements of Empiricism and Idealism. He opposes the prevailing notion of his academic colleagues that only scientific methods can lead to an understanding of the human condition, yet, criticizes any extreme reliance on logic as the sole basis of philosophical truth. In line with his philosophy, the powerful combination of empirical truth and philosophical logic excludes ungrounded practices that are against common humanity. For example, in Southern Sudan, the practice of sacrificing the spear master by the Dinkas became completely unjustified when the tribe survived after the practice was outlawed. Thus, cognitive or cultural perceptions, which deviate from the examined truth and accepted rationality, should be excluded from the common ground.

Apart from that, to ensure moral progress, the common ground requires that context-independent values not only supercede cultural practices, but also serve to reform
the culture itself. Such a purpose should not be misunderstood as a form of ethnocentrism, which is the point of view that one’s own way of life is to be preferred to all others. As John Kekes explains, for pluralism, moral progress occurs with “a closer approximation of valued possibilities not just for one particular point of view but for humanity as a whole.” Thus, in conclusion, moral pluralism needs a realistic common ground that is based on human being’s basic needs, rationality and empirically examined truth.

A flexibility with regard to the prioritization of moral values is another principle that should be emphasized to ensure that the goal of the common good be achieved. In Morality, Diversity and Human Rights, Kellenberger explains, “For monism…there’s only one and only one true ranking. For pluralism, there is a plurality of reasonable rankings in the light of different equally reasonable conceptions of good life.” Thus, values that are prioritized in moral pluralism should be distinguished from the pre-established overriding values in moral absolutism or moral monism. The central claim of moral pluralism that there is not a single moral value that is superior to others, should not be seem as justifying the claim that there is no possibility of assigning priority among different moral values according to different contexts. The prioritization of moral values requires an ability to perceive the “greatest good” and act wisely. Admittedly, such an approach tends to borrow a shade of pragmatism the doctrine that a statement is true and meaningful according to the practical results that would be experienced if that statement were acted upon. However, it is important to recognize that such a flexibility should not be equalized with the extreme form of pragmatism, which normally involves an attempt to wipe out the distinction between different kinds of truths. For a pragmatist, an action is not true because it corresponds to reality; therefore, there is no need to worry what sort of reality that makes that action the right one to perform. Moral pluralism has its metaphysical forms and does not deny the distinction between objective reality and ultimate reality.

A flexibility in prioritizing moral values is an antidote of the Kantian principle of the “absolute moral law” or the “assumption” of an absolute moral law. The French utilitarian Benjamin Constant asks Kant to consider whether, in Kant’s mind, it would not be right to lie to a murderer who asks whether one’s friend, who he means to kill, is hiding in one’s house. Kant sticks with his opinion and responds that “To be truthful (honest) in all declarations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency,”16 including human life. Such an over-rigid adherence to a single moral value. Truthfulness defeats the whole purpose of morality to promote good and eliminate evil. In Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics, Joram Graf Haber holds the position that one should be truthful to the murderer under whatsoever circumstances. He argues: “If by telling a lie you have prevented murder, you have made yourself legally responsible for all the consequences; but if you have held vigorously to the truth, public justice can lay no hand on you, whatever the unforeseen circumstances may be.” To me, it is not reasonable to cause an atrocity simply to avoid public responsibility. In fact, to achieve the greater good, it is justified that an individual ould prioritize his or her responsibilities to prevent inhumane acts and protect the good (innocence), with due consideration of the risks and possible consequences.

It is important to make a clear distinction between the concept of the “greater good”, as employed in this theory of ethics, and that of the same term in utilitarianism. In utilitarianism, no actions are intrinsically right or wrong as long as the goal of an action is to achieve the greatest happiness. John Stuart Mill, in Utilitarianism, says, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” In the concept of prioritizing moral values, one important basis is preserving the goodness and eliminating the evil. Happiness or pleasure is not the sole and ultimate motivation of action.

In conclusion, moral pluralism stands out among all types of moral theories presented by Kellenberger. Understanding Kant’s concept that we will never be able to see the “noumena” but can only base our principles upon “phenomena,” I refuse to embrace moral absolutism. This theory leaves the question of what absolute moral command is founded on open and unanswered. Yet, the nature of moral relativism as over-tolerating (all perspectives are equally valid), makes it unrealistic and dysfunctional in reaching the goal of the common good of human kind. This theory denies the fact that judgements are crucial in ensuring social order and harmony. Among all categorizations of moral theories, only moral pluralism’s reasonable balance of objectivity, diversity and universality ensures its survival in different cultural, social and spiritual contexts. However, there are still some possible sources of error when moral pluralism is applied in daily life, such as the impossibility of claiming “total objectivity” and the lack of a clear categorization of values that are intrinsically moral. Thus, the three principles proposed above, namely, the unambiguous categorization of moral values, the establishment of a minimalist common ground, and a flexibility with regard to the prioritizing of moral values, must be understood and integrated, to increase the applicability and universality of moral pluralism.

You can also order a custom term paper, research paper, thesis, dissertation or essay on moral from our professional custom essay writing company which provides students with high-quality custom written papers at an affordable cost.

0.00 avg. rating (0% score) - 0 votes

Tags: essay on moral relativism, example essay, moral essay, research paper on moral, term paper on moral

David Hume

Essays Moral, Political and Literary
(1741-1777)

 

 

Contents

(1) Editions of the Essay
(2) Edition codes
(3) David Hume's Essays Moral, Political and Literary

Around 1740, after the publication of his Treatise,David Hume began writing a series of shorter essays on specific economic, political, literary and philosophical topics.  These were not published in literary journals or reviews, but rather in a series of essay collections.   Over the course of his lifetime, Hume revised and corrected the essays and assembled new collections, combining prior collections, sometimes changing titles, adding more essays and sometimes withdrawing others. 

To assist researchers to track the origins of particular essays, we have compiled a list of Hume's Essays below with links to the original different versions of the essays. 

Editions of the Essays

List of editions (1741-1777) (all written and revised by Hume)

  • 1741 Essays, Moral and Political,the firstcollection, containing 15 essays. [bk]
  • 1742 Essays, Moral and Political second edition, corrected of first collection.
  • 1742 Essays, Moral and Political, Volume II, secondcollection of 12 new essays.
  • 1748  Three Essays, Moral and Political, never before published, which compleats the former edition in two volumes, thirdcollection of 3 new essays.
  • 1748 Essays, Moral and Political reprint of 26 essays.  Essays 1-15 are all fifteen essays from first collection, Essays 16-23 are nine essays (2 and 5-11) from second collection (so four suppressed: 1, 3, 4, withdrawn 12 reduced to footnote), Essays 24-26 are three essays of third collection.
  • 1748 Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, new treatise.[bk]
  • 1751 Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, second edition,  [bk]
  • 1751 An Enquiry Concerning Principles and Morals. new treatise..[bk]
  • 1752 Political Discourses, fourthcollection of 12 new essays, plus one appendix ("Scotticisms")
  • 1752 Political Discourses, second edition of fourth collection, 12 essays (appendix suppressed) [bk]
  • 1753-56 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, elaborate prior essay collection an treatises in four volumes
    • v.1-(1753)  26 essays.  Essays 1-15 are all fifteen from first collection, Essays 16-23 are nine essays (2, 5-11) from second collection, Essays 24-26 are three essays of third collection.
    • v.2 (1756) - reprint of 1748 treatise
    • v.3 (1753) -reprint 1751 treatise, with two new appendices
  • v.4 (1754) -12 essays, all twelve from fourth collection
  • 1757 Four Dissertations, a fifth collection of 4 new essays. [bk, av]
  • 1758 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, a new edition, reorganized everything in one volume.
  • [bk, dho]
    • "Essays Part I" contains 26 essays. Essays 1-15 are  from first (1741) collection, essays 16-23 are nine essays (= essays 2, 5-11) from second (1742) collection, essay 24 is one essay (1) from third (1748) collection, and essays 25-26 are two essays (3, 4) from fifth (1757) collection.
    • "Essays Part II" contains 14 essays: Essays 1-12 are from fourth (1752) collection intact, essays 13-14 are two essays (2, 3) from third (1748) collection
    • Remaining two dissertations (1, 2)  from fifth (1757) collection are reproduced as their own parts. ("Dissertation on the Passions", "Natural History of Religion")
    • Older two treatises (1748 Enquiry concerning human understanding, 1751 Enquiry on principles of morals) are reproduced as their own separate parts.
    • Post-printing, included additional insertion of two new essays (6*, 14*).
  • 1760 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, split everything into four volumes  [v.1, v.2, v.3, v.4]
    • v.1 = 26 essays (all 26 as arranged in 1758, Part I)
    • v.2, = 16 essays (14 essays as arranged in 1758 Part II plus the two 1758 inserted essays)
    • v.3 =  new eds of 1748 Enq conc. Human Understanding + 1757 Diss on Passions
    • v.4 = new eds. of 1751 Enq on Morals + 1757 Nat Hist Religion
  • 1764 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, in two volumes  [v.1, v.2]. 
    • v.1 = "Part I" contains 23 essays (three essays - 3,6 and 7 - from first collection suppressed),  "Part II" contains 16 essays (same as 1760 v.2)
    • v.2 = reproduces the two inquiries (1748, 1751) and the two dissertations of  the fifth (1757) collection.
  • 1767 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, (two volumes) [v.1, v.2].  straight reprint of 1764, with no revisions.
  • 1768 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, (two volumes) [v.1, v.2] - revised edition (but no structural changes)
  • 1770 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (four volumes) [v.1, v.2, v.3, .v.4]
    • v.1  = 22 essays (one essay (13) of first first collection suppressed)
    • v.2  = 16 essays (unchanged)
    • v.3, = unchanged  (enq + diss)
    • v.4 = unchanged (enq + diss)
  • 1772 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects  (two volumes): [v.1, v.2]
    • v.1,  = Part I  contains 22 essays , Part II contains 16 essays (structure unchanged from 1770)
    • v.2  = unchanged (enq + diss, enq + diss)..
  • 1777 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (two volumes) - last version revised by Hume.  [dho1, dho2]
    • v.1  = Part I  contains 23 essays (adds 1 new essay) , Part II contains 16 essays (same as in 1772)
    • v. 2  = unchanged (enq + diss, enq + diss)..
  • David  Hume died in 1776.  The Essays published in 1777 is the last version containing Hume's revisions.  Later posthumous editions usually just straight reprints of the 1777 edition. 

    Posthumous editionsafter 1777

    • 1779 Dublin [v.1, v.2]
    • 1784 London [v.1, v.2]
    • 1788 London [v.1, v.2]
    • 1793 Edinburgh  [v.1, v.2]
    • 1793 Basel [v.1, v.2, v.3, v.4]
    • 1800
    • 1804 Edinburgh [v.1, v.2]
    • 1809 Edinburgh [v.1, v.2]
    • 1817 Edinburgh [v.1, v.2]
    • 1822 London [v.1, v.2]
    • 1825 Edinburgh [v.1, v.2]
    • 1826 The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Edinburgh  (four volumes, complete works).
      • v.1 (Treatise, Bk.1)
      • v.2 (Treatise Bks 2 & 3, Dialogues on Natural Religion)
      • v.3 (Essays)
      • v.4 (Both Enquiries, plus appendix, plus Natural History of Religion, plus previous (withdrawn) essays)  
    • 1875 Green/Grose ed..Essays, Moral, Political and Literary  (two volumes): [1875 v.1, v.2][1882, v.1, v.2], [1889 v.1, v.2; av1, av2] [1898 v.1, v.2; av1, av2] [1907 v.1, v.2]
    • 1987 LibertyClassics edition of Essays Moral, Political and Literary (includes earlier withdrawn essays as Part III)

    Edition Codes

    There are various lists of editions of Hume's Essays depending on authors.

    • The 1826 Edinburgh list (1826: p.4) - codes different than Green-Grose
    • The 1874 list by T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (1874 p.85) - codes different than in 1826
    • The 2003 Thoemmes list by Fieser (2003 p.10, p.24)

    Although the Green-Grose 1874 list is adopted by many, it does not code all the versions.  We added codes "DD", "OO", "QQ", "S" and "T" that were not originally in Green-Grose..

    • A - Essays, Moral and Political. Edinburgh, 1741  [bk]
    • B - Essays, Moral and Political. Second edition, corrected, Edinburgh, 1742
    • C - Essays, Moral and Political, volume II, Edinburgh, 1742
    • D - Essays, Moral and Political, Third edition, London and Edinburgh, 1748
    • DD -  Three Essays, Moral and Political, never before published, which compleats the former edition in two volumes, 1748 (no label in Green-Grose as exact reprint of three new essays of D)
    • E - Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, London, 1748.[bk]
    • F - Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Second edition, with additions and corrections,  London, 1751 [bk]
    • G - An Enquiry Concerning Principles and Morals, 1751..[bk]
    • H - Political Discourses, Edinburgh, 1752
    • I -  Political Discourses, Second edition, 1752 [bk]
    • K - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1753-56 (four volumes), v.1 (Essays, 1753), v.2 (Understanding, 1756), v.3 (Morals,1753) v.4 (Political, 1754)
    • L - Four Dissertations, London, 1757 [bk]
    • M - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, a new edition, London & Edinburgh, 1758 (one volume) [bk]
    • N - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1760 (four volumes)  [v.1, v.2, v.3, v.4]
    • O - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1764 (two volumes) [v.1, v.2]
    • OO - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1767 (two volumes) [v.1, v.2]  (no code label in Green-Grose as exact reprint of 1764 with no revisions)
    • P - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1768 (two volumes) [v.1, v.2]
    • Q - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1770 (four volumes) [v.1, v.2, v.3, .v.4]
    • QQ - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1772 (two volumes): [v.1, v.2] (no code label in Green-Grose as exact reprint of 1770 with no revisions)
    • R - Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London & Edinburgh, 1777 (two volumes)  [dho1, dho2]
    • S  - Two Essays, London, 1777.[bk]  (no code label in Green-Grose)
    • T - Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1779.(no code label in Green-Grose)

    David Hume's Essays: Moral, Political and Literary

    The breakdown chart belowis based on the 1985 edition of Hume's Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, edited by E.F. Miller and published by Liberty Classics, Indianapolis.

    Its arrangement is based on the 1777 edition of the Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, vol. 1 (Edinburgh & London).Divided into two parts, the 1777 edition contains in Part I & Part II most of the essays of the original Essays: Moral and Political (1741), Essays vol II (1742), the Three Essays (1748), the Political Discourses (1752), two of the Four Dissertations (1757) plus three new essays ("Of the Jealousy of Trade" and "Of the Coalition of Parties", new in the 1758 ed., and the "On the Origin of Government", new in the 1777 ed).

    The 1985 Liberty Classics edition includes additional section called "Withdrawn and Unpublished Essays" (included at the bottom as Part III). These were essays from earlier editions which were withdrawn in the intermediary editions (1748-1772) of the Essays.  The essays "Of Suicide" and "Immortality of the Soul" were written c.1755-57, and intended to be included as part of the Dissertations, but given their controversial nature, Hume had them withdrawn at the last minute, before they were published.  They remained suppressed until after Hume's death, when they were finally they were published separately (and anonymously) as Two Essays in 1777.  They were included by the Edinburgh publisher as part of the 1825 edition of the Essays.

    Finally, it should be noted that Hume's great treatises, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), Enquiry on the Principles of Morals (1751) and two additional dissertations, "Dissertation on the Passions" and "Natural History of Religion", although never incorporated as part of the "Essays, Moral, Political, Literary", where nonetheless from 1753 onwards always published together with the Essays as part of the overarching collection known as  Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects.  So for the sake of completeness, we include their editions in the bottom as "Extra".  These are not included in the 1985 Liberty Classics edition. 

    Finally, there were some unpublished manuscripts and scattered pieces that never published as part of Essays, but many editors considered they were intended to be essays or parts of essays, and some editors included them in later posthumous editions as "Unpublished Essays". We include them here as "Unpublished Extra #2".  These are also not included in the 1985 edition.

    The order and numbering of the Essays below are as given in the 1985 edition.  The edition codes (A-R) are as given by Green-Grose (1875), with a few adjustments.

    EssayTitle (1985)Originally Pub.
    (Ed, date, essay no. page)
    NotesRevised EditionsOther links
    Part I     
    (1)"Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion"(A) 1741, (1), p.1   (K) 1753 (1), p.1
    (M) 1758 (1), p.3
    (N) 1760 (1), p.3
    (O) 1764 (1), p.3
     
    (2)"Of the Liberty of the Press"(A) 1741, (2), p.9 (K) 1753 (2), p.7
    (M) 1758 (2), p.6
    (N) 1760 (2), p.11
    (O) 1764 (2), p.9
     
    (3)"That Politics may be reduced to a Science"(A) 1741, (4)  p.27 (K) 1753 (4), p.20
    (M) 1758 (4), p.11
    (N) 1760 (4), p.25
    (O) 1764 (3), p.15
     
    (4)"Of the First Principles of Government"(A) 1741 (5) p.49 (K) 1753 (5), p.40
    (M) 1758 (5), p.20
    (N) 1760 (5), p.47
    (O) 1764 (4), p.31
    [McM]
    (5)"Of the Origin of Government"(R) 1777 (5)  1826 v.3 (p.37)
    (6)"Of the Independence of Parliament"(A) 1741 (8) p.79 (K) 1753 (8), p.61
    (M) 1758 (8), p.29
    (N) 1760 (8), p.71
    (O) 1764 (5), p.37
     
    (7)"Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy or to a Republic"(A) 1741 (9)  p.93 (K) 1753 (8), p.71
    (M) 1758 (9), p.33
    (N) 1760 (9), p.83
    (O) 1764 (6), p.43
     
    (8)"Of Parties in General"(A) 1741 (10) p.105 (K) 1753 (10), p.79
    (M) 1758 (10), p.36
    (N) 1760 (10), p.93
    (O) 1764 (7), p.51
     
    (9)"Of Parties of Great Britain"(A) 1741 (11)  p.119 (K) 1753 (11), p.90
    (M) 1758 (11), p.41
    (N) 1760 (11), p.107
    (O) 1764 (8), p.61
     
    (10)"Of Superstition and Enthusiasm"(A) 1741 (12) p.141 (K) 1753 (12), p.106
    (M) 1758 (12), p.48|
    (N) 1760 (12), p.125
    (O) 1764 (9), p.75
     
    (11)"Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature"(A) 1741 (14) p.161Original 1741 (A)  title: "Of the Dignity of Human Nature"
    Re-titled 1770 (Q) "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature"
    (K) 1753 (14), p.120
    (M) 1758 (14), p.53
    (N) 1760 (14), p.141
    (O) 1764 (11), v.88
     
    (12)"Of Civil Liberty"(A) 1741 (15)  p.173Original 1741 (A) title: "Of Liberty and Despotism"
    Re-titled 1758 (M) "Of Civil Liberty"
    (K) 1753 (15), p.129
    (M) 1758 (15), p.57
    (N) 1760 (15), p.151
    (O) 1764 (12), p.97
     
    (13)"Of Eloquence"(C) 1742 (2) (K) 1753 (16), p.140
    (M) 1758  (16) p.62
    (N) 1760 (16), p.165
    (O) 1764 (13), p.107
     
    (14)"Of the Rise and Progress of Arts and Sciences"(C) 1742 (5) (K) 1753 (17), p.159
    (M) 1758 (17) p.70
    (N) 1760 (17), p.187
    (O) 1764 (14), p.123
     
    (15)"The Epicurean" * "-or the man of elegance and pleasure"(C) 1742 (6) (K) 1753 (18), p.198
    (M) 1758 (18) p.86
    (N) 1760 (18), p.231
    (O) 1764 (15), p.155
     
    (16)"The Stoic"  *  "- or the man of action and virtue"(C) 1742 (7) (K) 1753 (19), p.209
    (M) 1758 (19) p.90
    (N) 1760 (19), p.243
    (O) 1764 (16), p.165
     
    (17)"The Platonist" * "- or the man of contemplation and philosophical devotion"(C) 1742 (8) (K) 1753 (20), p.221
    (M) 1758 (20) p.95
    (N) 1760 (20), p.257
    (O) 1764 (17), p.175
     
    (18)"The Skeptic"(C) 1742 (9) (K) 1753 (21), p.226
    (M) 1758 (21) p.97
    (N) 1760 (21), p.263
    (O) 1764 (18), p.181
     
    (19)"Of Polygamy and Divorces"(C) 1742 (10) (K) 1753 (22), p.256
    (M) 1758 (22) p.110
    (N) 1760 (22), p.297
    (O) 1764 (19), p.205
     
    (20)"Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing"(C) 1742 (11) (K) 1753 (23), p.270
    (M) 1758 (23) p.116
    (N) 1760 (23), p.313
    (O) 1764 (23), p.217
     
    (21)"Of National Characters"(DD) 1748 (1)orig (DD) 1748 Three Essays(D) 1748
    (K) 1753 (24), p.277
    (M) 1758 (24), p.119
    (N) 1760 (24), p.321
    (O) 1764 (21), p.223
     
    (22)"Of Tragedy"(L) 1757 (3) p.185orig. (L) 1757 Four Dissertations(M) 1758 (25), p.129
    (N) 1760 (25), p.349
    (O) 1764 (22), p.243
     
    (23)"Of the Standard of Taste"(L) 1757 (4)  p.203orig. (L) 1757 Four Dissertations(M) 1758 (26), p.134
    (N) 1760 (26), p.363
    (O) 1764 (23), p.253
     
          
    Part II     
    (1)"Of Commerce"(H) 1752 (1) (I) 1752 (1), p.1
    (K) 1754 (1), p.1
    (M) 1758 (1), p.149
    (N) 1760 (1), p.3
    (O) 1764 (1), p.281
     [McM,lib]
    (2)"Of Refinement in the Arts"(H) 1752 (2)original 1752 title "Of Luxury"
    re-titled 1760 (N) "Of Refinement in the Arts"
    (I) 1752 (2), p.23
    (K) 1754 (2), p.20
    (M) 1758 (2), p.157
    (N) 1760 (2), p.25
    (O) 1764 (2), p.297
     
    (3)"Of Money"(H) 1752 (3) (I) 1752 (3) p.41
    (K) 1754 (3), p.36
    (M) 1758 (3) p.164
    (N) 1760 (3), p.43
    (O) 1764 (3), p.311
     [McM,lib]
    (4)"Of the Balance of Trade"(H) 1752 (5) (I) 1752 (5)  p.79
    (K) 1754 (5), p.69
    (M) 1758 (5), p.179
    (N) 1760 (5), p.81 
    (O) 1764 (5), p.341
    [McM,  lib]
    (5)"Of the Jealousy of Trade"(M) 1758  (6*), p.187as additional essay to be inserted to (M) 1758. after printing(M) 1758 (6*), p.187
    (N) 1760 (6), p.105
    (O) 1764 (6), p.361
    [McM , lib]
    (6)"Of Interest"(H) 1752 (4) (I) 1752 (4) p.61
    (K) 1754 (4), p.53
    (M) 1758 (4), p.172
    (N) 1760 (4), p.63 
    (O) 1764 (4), p.327
    [McM, lib]
    (7)"Of the Balance of Power"(H) 1752 (6) (I) 1752 (6) p.101
    (K) 1754 (6), p.89
    (M) 1758 (6), p.187
    (N) 1760 (7), p.111
    (O) 1764 (7), p.367
     
    (8)"Of Taxes"(H) 1752 (7) (I) 1752 (7)  p.115
    (K) 1754 (7), p.100
    (M) 1758 (7), p.192
    (N) 1760 (8), p.125
    (O) 1764 (8), p.377
    [McM, lib] 
    (9)"Of Public Credit"(H) 1752 (8) (I) 1752 (8) p.123
    (K) 1754 (8), p.107
    (M) 1758 (8) p.196
    (N) 1760 (9), p.133
    (O) 1764 (9), p.383
    [McM, moa]
    (10)"Of Some Remarkable Customs"(H) 1752 (9) (I) 1752 (9) p.143
    (K) 1754 (9), p.124
    (M) 1758 (9), p.203
    (N) 1760 (10), p.153
    (O) 1764 (10), p.401
     
    (11)"Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations"(H) 1752 (10) (I) 1752 (10) p.155
    (K) 1754 (10), p.135
    (M) 1758 (10), p.208
    (N) 1760 (11), p.167
    (O) 1764 (11), p.411
     
    (12)"Of the Original Contract"(DD) 1748 (2)orig (DD) 1748 Three Essays(D) 1748
    (K) 1753 (25 of Pt I), p.301
    (M) 1758 (11 of Pt II), p.252
    (N) 1760 (12), p.287
    (O) 1764 (12) p.491
     
    (13)"Of Passive Obedience"(DD) 1748 (3)orig (DD) 1748 Three Essays(D) 1748
    (K) 1753 (26 of Pt. I), p 327
    (M) 1758  (12 of Pt. II) p.263
    (N) 1760 (13), p.317
    (O) 1764 (13), p.513
     
    (14)"Of the Coalition of Parties"(M) 1758 (14*), p.265as additional essay to be inserted to (M) 1758. after printing(M) 1758 (14*), p.265
    (N) 1760 (14) p.323
    (O) 1764 (14), p.517
     
    (15)"Of the Protestant Succession"(H) 1752 (11) (I) 1752 (11) p.263
    (K) 1754 (11), p.235
    (M) 1758 (13), p.265
    (N) 1760 (15), p.337
    (O) 1764 (15), p.527
     
    (16)"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth"(H) 1752 (12) (I) 1752 (12)  p.281
    (K) 1754 (12), p.250
    (M) 1758 (14), p.271
    (N) 1760 (16), p.355
    (O) 1764 (16), p.539
     
          
     III Withdrawn and Unpublished Essays    
    (1)"Of Essay-Writing"(C) 1742 (1)suppressed 1748 (D) 1826, v.4 (p.538)
    1875, v.2 (p.367)
    (2)"Of Moral Prejudices"(C) 1742 (3)suppressed 1748 (D) 1826 v.4 (p.543)
    1875 v.2, (p.371)
    (3)"Of the Middle Station of Life"(C) 1742 (4)suppressed 1748 (D) 1826 v.4 (p.550)
    1875, v.2  (p.375)
    (4)"Of Impudence and Modesty"(A) 1741 (3) p.19suppressed 1764 (O)(K) 1754 (3), p.14
    (M) 1758 (3), p.9
    (N) 1760 (3), p.19
    1826 v.4 (p.517)
    1875, v.2 (p.380)
    (5)"Of Love and Marriage"(A) 1741 (6) p.59suppressed 1764 (O)(K) 1754 (6), p.47
    (M) 1758 (6), p.23
    (N) 1760 (6), p.55
    1826 v.4 (p.526)
    1875 v.2 (p.383)
    (6)"Of the Study of History"(A) 1741 (7) p.69suppressed 1764 (O)(K) 1754 (7), p.54
    (M) 1758 (7) p.26
    (N) 1760 (7), p.63
    1826 v.4 (p.528)
    1875 v.2 (p.388)
    (7)"Of Avarice"(A) 1741 (13) p.153suppressed 1770 (Q)(K) 1754 (13), p.114
    (M) 1758 (13), p.51
    (N) 1760 (13), p.135
    (O) 1764 (10), p.83
    1826 v.4 (p.533)
    1875 v.2 (p.392)
    (8)"A Character of Sir Robert Walpole"(C) 1742 (12)reduced to footnote 1748 (D)
    suppressed 1770 (Q)
    (M) 1758 fn p.191826 v.3 (p.29)
    1875 v.2 (p.395)
    (9)"Of Suicide"(S) 1777 (1), p.1orig  Five Dissertations (c. 1757, unpub)
    pub. 1777 (S) Two Essays
     1826 v.4 (p.556)
    1875 v.2 (p.406)
    [moa]
    (10)"Of the Immortality of the Soul"(S) 1777 (2), p.25orig Five Dissertations (c.1757, unpub)
    pub. 1777 (S) Two Essays
     1826 v.4 (p.568)
    1875 v.2 (p.399)
    [moa]
          
          
    ExtraTreatises and Dissertations
    (Not considered part of Essays, Moral, Political and Literary,
    but nonetheless almost always published along with them
    as part of Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects)
        
     "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding"(E) 1748 [bk]orig. titled Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding
    orig. separate treatise (E) 1748 [bk], (F) 1751  [bk]
    but included with (K) 1756 ETSS onwards.
     
    as ETSS:
    (K) 1756, v.2,
    (M) 1758, p.281
    (N) 1760 v.3
    (O) 1764, v.2, p.1
    1826 v.4 (p.1)
     "Enquiry concerning Principals of Morals"(G) 1751 [bk] Orig. separate treatise (G) 1751.[bk]
    but included with (K) 1753 ETSS, with appendices
    as ETSS:
    (K) 1753, v.3
    (M) 1758  p.395
    (N) 1760 v.4
    (O) 1764 v.2, p.223
    1826 v.4 (p.235)
     "App - Of Self Love"(G) 1751, p.11-22Introduction to Section 2 "On Benevolence" in (G) 1751.
    Moved in (R) 1777 to separate "Appendix II"..
     1826 v.4 (p.378)
     "App. I - Concerning Moral Sentiment"(K) 1753, v.3, p.199Appendix I to Enq on Morals in (K) 1753, vol. 3 (M) 1758 p.467
    (N) 1760, v.4, p.193
    (O) 1764 v.2, p.359
    1826 v.4 (p.366)
     "App. II - Some farther considerations with regard to Justice"(K) 1753, v.3, p.215Appendix 1I to Enq on Morals in (K) 1753, vol. 3
    re-titled Appendix III in (R) 1777
    (M) 1758 p.473
    (N) 1760 v.4 p.209
    (O) 1764 v.2, p.371
    1826, v.4 (p.387)
     "A Dialogue"(K) 1753 v.3, p.227After appendices to Enq on Morals(M) 1758, p.478
    (N) 1760 v.4, p.223
    (O) 1764 v.2,  p.393
    1826, v.4 (p.409)
     "The Natural History of Religion"(L) 1757 (1),  p.1orig. (L) 1757 Four Dissertations
    included with (M) 1758 ETSS after Enq on Morals
    (M) 1758, p.491
    (N) 1760 v.4, p.253
    (O) 1764 v.2, p.415
    1826, v.4 (p.435)
     "Dissertation on the Passions"(L) 1757 (2), p.121orig. (L) 1757 Four Dissertations
    included with (M) 1758 ETSS, after Enq on Human Underst
    (M) 1758, p.376
    (N) 1760, v.3 p.251
    (O) 1764 v.2, p.185
    1826, v.4 (p.195)
     "App. III - Of some Verbal Disputes"(O) 1764, v.2, p.381re-titled "Appendix IV" in (R) 1777 1826 v.4 (p.396)
          
    Extra #2Unpublished or withdrawn extra    
     "Authenticity of Ossian's Poems"unpublished ms  1875 v.2 (p.415)
     "Letter to the Authors of the Critical Review concerning the Epigoniad of Wilkie"1759, Critical Review (Apr), p.323  1875 v.2 (p.425)
     "Dedication to the Four Dissertations"some (L) 1757withdrawn during printing of  (L) 1757 Four Dissertations.
    only printed in some copies.
     1875 v.2 (p.439)
     "Descent on the Coast of Brittany in 1746, and the causes of its failure"unpublished ms  1875 v.2 (p.443)
     "Scotticisms"(H) 1752   1826 v.1 (p.cxxiii)
    1875 v.2 (p.461)
          

  • Go to David Hume Page